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Abstract
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that com-
presses an arbitrary block of numerical data and returns a fixed-size bit
string. There exists many hash functions: MD5, HAVAL, SHA, ... It
was reported that these hash functions are no longer secure. Our work
is focused on the construction of a new hash function based on composi-
tion of functions. The construction used the NP-completeness of Three-
dimensional contingency tables and the relaxation of the constraint that
a hash function should also be a compression function.
Keywords : NP-complete, One-way function, Matrix of zeros and ones,
Three-dimensional contingency table, Collision-resistant hash function.
1 Introduction
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that compresses an
arbitrary block of data and returns fixed-size bit string, the hash value (message
digest or digest). An accidental or intentional change of the data will almost
certainly change the hash value. Hash functions are used to verify the integrity
of data or data signature.
Let us suppose that h : X → Y is a hash function without key. The function h
is secured if the following three problems are difficult to solve.
Problem 1: First Preimage attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y and an image y ∈ Y
Query: x ∈ X such that h(x) = y
We suppose that a possible hash y is given, we want to know if there exists x
such that h(x) = y. If we can solve First Preimage attack, then (x, y) is a valid
1
2pair. A hash function for which First Preimage attack can’t be solved efficiently
is sometimes called Preimage resistant.
Problem 2: Second Preimage attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y and an element x1 ∈ X
Query: x2 ∈ X such that x1 6= x2 and h(x1) = h(x2)
A message x1 is given, we want to find a message x2 such that x2 6= x1 and
h(x1) = h(x2). If this is possible, then (x2, h(x1)) is a valid pair. A function
for which Second preimage attack can’t be solve efficiently is sometimes called
Second preimage resistant.
Problem 3: Collision attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y
Query: x1, x2 ∈ X such that x1 6= x2 and h(x1) = h(x2)
We want to known if it is possible to find two distinct messages x1 and x2 such
that h(x1) = h(x2). A function for which Collision attack can’t be solve effi-
ciently is sometimes called Collision resistant.
There exists many hash functions: MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD,
HAVAL. It was reported that such widely hash functions are no longer secured
[7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Thus, new hash functions should be studied. The
existing hash functions such as MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL...
want to achieve two goals at the same time:
a◦) For any input x, they return a hash of x (of fixed length, this length depends
on the hash function choosed)
b◦) Preimage resistant, Second Preimage resistant and Collision Resistant.
Our contribution is to separate the two goals defined in points a◦) and b◦).
Our hash function H3 is defined as follows:
• H3 = H2oH1,
• H2 is a classical hash function such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD,
HAVAL, ....
• Given a y, find x such that H1(x) = y is NP-Complete,
• Find x1, x2 such that x1 6= x2 and H1(x1) = H1(x2) is NP-Complete,
• For any input x, the length of H1(x) is not fixed. This is the main differ-
ence with the classical hash functions.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, some preliminaries are pre-
sented. Section 3 is devoted to the design of our hash function. Concluding
remarks are stated in Section 4.
32 Preliminaries
Let’s define some preliminaries useful for the next section.
2.1 Two-dimensional
Data security in two dimension have been studied by many authors [2, 3, 9, 17].
Let m and n be two positive integers, and let R = (r1, r2, . . . , rm) and S =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) be non-negative integral vectors. Denoted by A(R,S) the set of
all m× n matrices A = (aij) satisfying
aij = 0 or 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
n∑
j=1
aij = ri for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m;
m∑
i=1
aij = sj for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Thus a matrix of 0’s and 1’s belongs to A(R,S) provided its row sum vector is
R and its column sum vector is S. The set A(R,S) was studied by many authors
[1, 4, 5, 6, 16]. Ryser [16] has defined an interchange to be a transformation
which replaces the 2× 2 submatrix :
B0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
of a matrix A of 0’s and 1’s with the 2× 2 submatrix
B1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
If the submatrix B0 (or B1) lies in rows k, l and columns u, v, then we call the
interchange a (k, l;u, v) -interchange. An interchange (or any finite sequence of
interchanges) does not alter the row and column sum vectors of a matrix. Ryser
has shown the following result.
Theorem 1 [16] Let A and A∗ be two m and n matrices composed of 0’s and
1’s, possessing equal row sum vectors and equal column sum vectors. Then A is
transformable into A∗ by a finite number of interchanges.
Let us consider a matrix A ∈ {0, 1}n×n ∈ A(R,S), i.e. its row sum vector
R is such that R ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}n and its column sum vector S is such that
S ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}n. We define the function g1 from {0, 1}
n×n to N2n as follows:
g1(A) =R(1)||R(2)|| . . . ||R(n)||
S(1)||S(2)|| . . . ||S(n)
where ‖ denotes the concatenation.
42.2 Three-dimensional
Irving and Jerrum [15] have studied the extension of the problem in three di-
mension and shown that problems that are solvable in polynomial time in the
two-dimensional case become NP-Complete. Suppose that for a given n×n×n
table D of non-negative integers, and for each i, j, k, the row, column and file
sums are denoted by R(i, k), C(j, k) and F (i, j) respectively. In other words:
R(i, k) =
n∑
j=1
D(i, j, k)
C(j, k) =
n∑
i=1
D(i, j, k)
F (i, j) =
n∑
k=1
D(i, j, k)
The following problem is studied by Irving and Jerrum [15] :
Problem 4. Three-dimensional contingency tables (3DCT)
Instance: A positive integer n, and for each i, j, k non-negative integers
values R(i, k), C(j, k) and F (i, j)
Question: Does there exist an n × n × n contingency table X of non-
negative integers such that:
n∑
j=1
X(i, j, k) = R(i, k)
n∑
i=1
X(i, j, k) = C(j, k)
n∑
k=1
X(i, j, k) = F (i, j)
for all i, j, k ? Irving and Jerrum show the following result:
Corollary 1 [15] 3DCT is NP-Complete, even in the special case where all the
row, column and file sums are 0 or 1.
Let us consider a matrix A ∈ Nn×n×n such that its row sum matrix is a
matrix R such that R ∈ Nn×n (i.e. R(i, k) ∈ N) , the column sum matrix is a
matrix C such that C ∈ Nn×n (i.e. C(j, k) ∈ N) and the file sum matrix is a
matrix F such that F ∈ Nn×n (i.e. F (i, j) ∈ N). We define the function g2 as
follows:
g2 : N
n×n×n −→ N3n
2
g2(A) =R(1, 1)||R(1, 2)|| . . . ||R(n, n)||
C(1, 1)||C(1, 2)|| . . . ||C(n, n)||
F (1, 1)||F (1, 2)|| . . . ||F (n, n)
5Let us consider the following matrices A and B. We define the element
product of matrices A and B as follows:
Definition 1 Element Product of Matrices of dimension 2
Let A,B ∈ Rn1×n2 , we define the Element product of matrices A and B as
follows:
C = A . ∗ B ; where cij = aij × bij for i, j such that
1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n2
Definition 2 Element Product of Matrices of dimension 3
Let A,B ∈ Rn1×n2×n3 , we define the Element product of matrices A and B as
follows:
C = A . ∗ B ; where cijk = aijk × bijk for i, j, k such that
1 ≤ i ≤ n1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ n2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n3
3 Design of the hash function
Before the construction of our hash function, let us explain the main idea.
3.1 Explanation of the idea by an example
In page 175 of paper [1], Brualdi gives the example of the following five matrices:
A1 =

 1 1 01 1 0
0 0 1

 ; A2 =

 1 1 01 0 1
0 1 0

 ; A3 =

 1 1 00 1 1
1 0 0


A4 =

 0 1 11 1 0
1 0 0

 ; A5 =

 1 0 11 1 0
0 1 0


which belong to A(R,S) where R = S = (2, 2, 1). Let us note W the following
matrix:
W =

 1 4 92 8 18
3 12 27


Based on the Element Product of Matrix defined in the previous subsection, it
is easy to verify that:
A1 .∗W =

 1 4 02 8 0
0 0 27

 ; A2 .∗W =

 1 4 02 0 18
0 12 0

 ; A3 .∗W =

 1 4 00 8 18
3 0 0


6A4 . ∗ W =

 0 4 92 8 0
3 0 0

 ; A5 . ∗ W =

 1 0 92 8 0
0 12 0


By computation, we evaluate that:
g1(A1 . ∗ W ) = 5||10||27||3||12||27 g1(A2 . ∗ W ) = 5||20||12||3||16||18
g1(A3 . ∗ W ) = 5||26||3||4||12||18 g1(A4 . ∗ W ) = 13||10||3||5||12||9
g1(A5 . ∗ W ) = 10||10||12||3||20||9
It is easy to verify that A1(2, 2) 6= A2(2, 2), A1(2, 3) 6= A2(2, 3) , A1(3, 2) 6=
A2(3, 2) and A1(3, 3) 6= A2(3, 3). All these differences imply that
• the second term of g1(A1 . ∗ W ) is not equal to the second term of
g1(A2 . ∗ W ),
• the third term of g1(A1 .∗W ) is not equal to the third term of g1(A2 .∗W ),
• the fifth term of g1(A1 .∗ W ) is not equal to the fifth term of g1(A2 .∗ W ),
• the sixth term of g1(A1 .∗W ) is not equal to the sixth term of g1(A2 .∗W ).
More formally, from the construction of g1, we can deduce easily that if
A(i, j) 6= B(i, j), then :
c◦) the i-th term of g1(A .∗ W ) would probably be different from the i-th term
of g1(B . ∗ W ),
d◦) the (n+j)-th term of g1(A . ∗ W ) would probably be different from the
(n+j)-th term of g1(B . ∗ W ).
From the fact that 3DCT which is related to g2 (this is an extension of g1)
is NP-Complete, we deduce that:
e◦) Given y and a matrix W , find a matrix A such that g2(A . ∗ W ) = y is
NP-Complete.
Our idea is to build a new hash function H3 such that H3 = H2oH1 where
• H2 is a classical hash function such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD,
HAVAL,...
• H1 is a function which exploits the ideas presented in c
◦) , d◦) and e◦).
Let us denote V Ones(n) the vector such that V Ones(n) ∈ {0, 1}n and each
of its elements is equal to 1. Also, let us denote MOnes(n) the matrix such
that MOnes(n) ∈ {0, 1}n×n and each of its elements is equal to 1. in other
words:
V Ones(n)i = 1 where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Mones(n)i,j = 1 where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
7We denote N+ the set of strictly positive natural number defined as follows:
N+ = N \ {0} = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . .}
In the next sub-section, we formalize the observation made in points c◦) and
d◦) and we take into account the NP-Completeness of 3DCT to build a new
hash function.
3.2 Construction of the new hash function
For any integers a and p such that 0 ≤ a ≤ −1 + 2p, let us denote bin(a, p) the
decomposition of the integer a in base 2 on p positions. In other words:
bin(a, p) = xp−1xp−2 . . . x1x0 and
p−1∑
i=0
xi × 2
i = a
Let us also define the following function:
f0(n) = ⌈log2(n+ 1)⌉
f0(n) represents the number of bits necessary to represent any integer between
0 and n in base 2.
We also define the following functions:
f1(A) = max


n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
A(i, j, k) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n

 ,
f2(A) = max
{
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
A(i, j, k) : 1 ≤ j ≤ n
}
,
f3(A) = max


n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
A(i, j, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ n

 ,
f4(A) = max { f1(A), f2(A), f3(A) } .
f4(A) represents the maximun of sum of any n consecutive elements of the ma-
trix A belonging to the same row, or to the same column or to the same file.
f0of4(A) represents the number of bits necessary to represent in base 2 the sum
of any n consecutive elements of the matrix A belonging to the same row, or to
the same column, or to the same file.
Subsequently, in the aim to be more precise, we redefine g2 as follows:
g2(A) =bin(R(1, 1), f0of4(A))||bin(R(1, 2), f0of4(A))|| . . . ||bin(R(n, n), f0of4(A))||
bin(C(1, 1), f0of4(A))||bin(C(1, 2), f0of4(A))|| . . . ||bin(C(n, n), f0of4(A))||
bin(F (1, 1), foof4(A))||bin(F (1, 2), f0of4(A))|| . . . ||bin(F (n, n), f0of4(A))
8Let us define the following problem:
Problem 5:
Instance: A positive integer n, two binary strings x and y
two matrices V,W ∈ Nn×n×n
Query: Find two matrices A,B ∈ {0, 1}n×n×n
such that:
A 6= B
g2(A . ∗ V ) = g2(B . ∗ V ) = x
g2(A . ∗ W ) = g2(B . ∗ W ) = y
Let us characterize the complexity of Problem5.
Proposition 1 Problem 5 is NP-Complete.
Proof Idea of Proposition 1:
We want to show how to transform a solution of 3DCT to a solution of Problem
5 . Without loss of generality, we work in dimension 2. Let us suppose that we
want to find a matrix A ∈ {0, 1}3×3 such that:
3∑
j=1
A(i, j) = R(i) (1a)
3∑
i=1
A(i, j) = C(j) (1b)
where R = (3, 2, 1) and C = (2, 3, 1).
It is easy to see that the determination of the matrix A ∈ {0, 1}3×3 which verifies
Equations (1) is also equivalent to determining the matrix B ∈ {0, 1}6×6 such
that:
6∑
j=1
B(i, j) = Rd(i) (2a)
6∑
i=1
B(i, j) = Cd(j) (2b)
where Rd = (3, 2, 1, 3, 2, 1) and Cd = (2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1).
Remark 1: Rd ( respectively Cd ) is a duplication of R ( respectively C ).
It is easy to see that from the matrix:
A =

 1 1 11 1 0
0 1 0


9which verifies Equations (1), we can associate the two following matrices B2
and B3
B2 =
(
A 03×3
03×3 A
)
=


1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0


B3 =
(
03×3 A
A 03×3
)
=


0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0


which verify Equations (2). This is the idea of the transformation which as-
sociates to one solution of the problem defined in Equations (1) two distinct
solutions of the problem defined in Equations (2).
Before the proof, let us introduce the function duplic (which is pseudo-duplication
) of x. We note:
x = x(1)x(2) . . . x(p) (3)
where x(i) ∈ {0, 1} and p = 3× n2 × ⌈log2(n+ 1)⌉. We define the function t as
follows:
t(i, n) = i× n× ⌈log2(n+ 1)⌉ ; 0 ≤ i ≤ 3n. (4)
The function duplic is defined as follows:
duplic(x, n) =dcopy(x, 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, n, n)||
dcopy(x, 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, n, n)||
dcopy(x, n+ 1, n)||dcopy(x, n+ 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 2n, n)||
dcopy(x, n+ 1, n)||dcopy(x, n+ 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 2n, n)||
dcopy(x, 2n+ 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2n+ 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 3n, n)||
dcopy(x, 2n+ 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2n+ 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 3n, n)
where dcopy(x, i, n) is defined as follows:
dcopy(x, i, n) = strcopy(x, i, n)||strcopy(x, i, n)
and
strcopy(x, i, n) = x(1 + t(i− 1, n))x(2 + t(i− 1, n)) . . . x(t(i, n))
10
For illustration, duplic(x, 3) is defined as follows:
duplic(x, 3) =x(1) . . . x(6)x(1) . . . x(6)x(7) . . . x(12)x(7) . . . x(12)x(13) . . . x(18)x(13) . . . x(18)||
x(1) . . . x(6)x(1) . . . x(6)x(7) . . . x(12)x(7) . . . x(12)x(13) . . . x(18)x(13) . . . x(18)||
x(19) . . . x(24)x(19) . . . x(24)x(25) . . . x(30)x(25) . . . x(30)x(31) . . . x(36)x(31) . . . x(36)||
x(19) . . . x(24)x(19) . . . x(24)x(25) . . . x(30)x(25) . . . x(30)x(31) . . . x(36)x(31) . . . x(36)||
x(37) . . . x(42)x(37) . . . x(42)x(43) . . . x(48)x(43) . . . x(48)x(49) . . . x(54)x(49) . . . x(54)||
x(37) . . . x(42)x(37) . . . x(42)x(43) . . . x(48)x(43) . . . x(48)x(49) . . . x(54)x(49) . . . x(54)
Remark 2: In the definition of strcopy(x, i, n), the term x(1+t(i−1, n))x(2+
t(i − 1, n)) . . . x(t(i, n)) means the concatenation of all the elements between
x(1 + t(i − 1, n)) and x(t(i, n)). In other words: x(1 + t(i − 1, n))x(2 + t(i −
1, n) . . . x(t(i, n)) = x(1+t(i−1, n))x(2+t(i−1, n) . . . x(j) . . . x(−1+t(i, n))x(t(i, n))
where 1 + t(i− 1, n) ≤ j ≤ t(i, n).
Proof of Proposition 1 : It suffices to show that 3DCT ≤Pm Problem 5.
Let us suppose that the procedure Generalize solves Problem 5 and we want
to show how to build a procedure Sol3DCT which solves 3DCT.
The procedure Sol3DCT takes as input a binary string x, an integer n and
returns as output the matrix A of size n such that g2(A) = x. The procedure
Generalize takes as input:
• p the dimension of the matrices
• two binary strings x and y
• two matrices V and W
and returns as output:
• two matrices C and D such that:
• g2(C . ∗ V ) = g2(D . ∗ V ) = x and g2(C . ∗ W ) = g2(D . ∗ W ) = y
We show in the procedure below how to use Generalize as a subroutine to solve
Sol3DCT .
Procedure Sol3DCT( n : integer , x : string , var A : matrix ) ;
V, W , C , D : matrix
p , i , j , k : integer
z : string
begin
1: V ←−MOnes(2n)
2: W ←−Mones(2n)
3: z ←− duplic(x, n)
4: p←− 2× n
5: Generalize(p, z, z, V,W,C,D)
6: For i = 1 to n do
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7: For j = 1 to n do
8: For k = 1 to n do
9: A(i, j, k)←− C(i, j, k) + C(i, j + n, k)
10: Endfor
11: Endfor
12: Endfor
end
Remark 3: In the procedure Sol3DCT, the matrix A belongs to the set
{0, 1}n×n×n, whereas the matrices C,D belong to the set {0, 1}2n×2n×2n.
The string z of the procedure Sol3DCT (see instruction 3) is constructed
such that g2(A) = x if and only if the matrices C and D defined in Equations
(5) and (6) are the solutions of Problem 5 with the following entries:
• 2n the dimension of the matrices,
• two binary strings z and z,
• two matrices V and W such that V =Mones(2n) , W =Mones(2n).
The terms of the matrix C are:

C(i, j, k) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i, j + n, k) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i+ n, j, k) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i+ n, j + n, k) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i, j, k + n) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i, j + n, k + n) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i+ n, j, k + n) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
C(i+ n, j + n, k + n) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n.
(5)
The terms of the matrix D are:

D(i, j, k) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i, j + n, k) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i + n, j, k) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i + n, j + n, k) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i, j, k + n) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i, j + n, k + n) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i + n, j, k + n) = 0, if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n ;
D(i + n, j + n, k + n) = A(i, j, k), if 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n.
(6)

The main idea of the design of the Collision-resistant hash function H3 is
that:
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• the hash function H3 is the composition of two functions H1 and H2,
• the function H1 is a function for which Problem 1, Problem 2 and Problem
3 can’t be solved efficiently and H1 is not a compression function.
• H2 is a hash function such as SHA-256, RIPEMD, or HAVAL, ....
Notation 1 Let us consider two vectors V1 and V2. We say that V1 is not a
linear combination of V2 and we note V1 is NLC of V2 if and only if 6 ∃ α ∈ R
such that V1 = αV2.
Two matrices F,G ∈ Nn×n×n+ verify the hypotheses (7) if and only if :
F 6= G (7a)
∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the vector F(i, j, ∗) is NLC of the vector G(i, j, ∗)
(7b)
∀j, k such that 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, the vector F(∗, j, k) is NLC of the vector G(∗, j, k)
(7c)
∀i, k such that 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n, the vector F(i, ∗, k) is NLC of the vector G(i, ∗, k)
(7d)
∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the vector F(i, j, ∗) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7e)
∀j, k such that 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, the vector F(∗, j, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7f)
∀i, k such that 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n, the vector F(i, ∗, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7g)
∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the vector G(i, j, ∗) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7h)
∀j, k such that 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, the vector G(∗, j, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7i)
∀i, k such that 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n, the vector G(i, ∗, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
(7j)
The matrices V and W used as entries in the procedures H1 and H3 below
verify the hypotheses defined by Equations (7). We note ǫ the empty chain. Let
us define the function V ectMat which takes as input a vector V ect of size n3
and returns as output an equivalent matrix A of size n× n× n.
Procedure V ectMat (Vect : Table[1..n3] of bit ; Var A : Table[1..n, 1..n,
1..n] of bit )
Var i, j, k , t : integer
Begin
t← 1
For i = 1 to n do
For j = 1 to n do
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For k = 1 to n do
A(i, j, k)← V ect(t)
t← t+ 1
endfor
endfor
endfor
End
The function H1 is defined as follows:
Function H1 :
Entry. M0 the initial message
V : Table[1..n, 1..n,1..n] of integer
W : Table[1..n, 1..n,1..n] of integer
n: an integer
Output. M2: an intermediate message
Var i, p : integer
Begin
1. Pad M0 with one bit equal to 1, followed by a variable number of
zero bits and a block of bits encoding the length of M0 in bits,
so that the total length of the padded message is the smallest
possible multiple of n3. Let M1 denote the padded message
2. Cut M1 into a sequence of n
3-bits vectors
B1, B2, . . . , Bi, . . . Bp
3. M2 ← ǫ
4. For i = 1 to p do
4.1 V ectMat(Bi, A)
4.2 M2 ← M2 ‖ g2(A. ∗ V ) ‖ g2(A. ∗W )
Endfor
5. return M2
End
Our hash function H3 is defined as the composition of the function H1 and
H2, where H2 is a hash function such as SHA-256, RIPEMD, HAVAL... The
matrices V and W used as entry in the hash function H3 must verify the hy-
potheses defined in Equations (7). To obtain the hash of the message M0 by
H3, we proceed as follows:
• we obtain the intermediate message M2 by application of the function H1
to the message M0,
• by application of the hash function H2 to M2, we build the hash of the
initial message.
Formally, the hash function is defined as follows:
Procedure H3 :
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Entry. M0 the initial message
V : Table[1..n, 1..n,1..n] of integer
W : Table[1..n, 1..n,1..n] of integer
n : an integer
Output. Result : the hash of the message M0
Begin
M2 ← H1(M0, V,W, n)
Result ← H2(M2)
End
Comment :
We can represent roughly the function H1 as follows:
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A
(1)    (2)
g2(A.*W)g2(A.*V)
 (3) (4)
 (5)
     g2(A.*V)||g2(A.*W)
 (6)
Figure 1: Roughly Representation of the function H1
In the Figure 1:
• the aim of the branches (1) and (2) is to make that the Problem 2 and
Problem 3 are difficult to solve efficiently for the function H3
• the aim of the branch (6) is to make sure that Problem 1 is difficult to
solve efficiently for the function H3
During some attacks, an adversary is needed to solve the following problem:
Problem 6:
Instance: Matrices A, V, W
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Binary strings : g2(A . ∗ V ) and g2(A . ∗ W )
Query: Find a matrix B such that A 6= B and:
g2(A . ∗ V ) = g2(B . ∗ V )
g2(A . ∗ W ) = g2(B . ∗ W )
Based on Problem 5, we deduce that Problem 6 is NP-Complete.
Second Preimage attack and Collision of the function H3 are difficult be-
cause:
• Problem 5 and Problem 6 are NP-Complete,
• From the fact that V and W verify the hypotheses (7), we deduce that if
we take two matrices A and B such that A 6= B, then we would probably
have g2(A . ∗ V )||g2(A . ∗ W ) 6= g2(B . ∗ V )||g2(B . ∗ W ).
First Preimage attack of the functionH3 is difficult because the 3DCT is NP-
Complete. Truncated differential attack of H1 is possible, but the differential
attack of H3 is difficult because 3DCT is NP-Complete and also Problem 5 is
NP-Complete.
4 Numerical Simulation
Let’s consider the two messages x1 and x2 :
x1 =d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70
x2 =d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70
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We have MD5(x1)=MD5(x2)= EFE502F744768114B58C8523184841F3
after applying our hash function on these messages using n = 8, V [i][j][k] =
i+ 8j + 64k, W [i][j][k] = 700− (j + 8 ∗ k + 64 ∗ i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n we obtain:
H3(x1)= 5fe0e56f9a4ab66a47d73ce660a2c4eb and
H3(x2) = 620e2f3cfe0afc403c0a8343173526fc.
It follows that MD5(x1) =MD5(x2) whereas H3(x1) 6= H3(x2).
5 Conclusion
From a classical hash function H2, we have built a new hash function H3 from
which First Preimage attack, Second Preimage attack and Collision attack are
difficult to solve. Our new hash function is a composition of functions. The
construction used the NP-completeness of Three-dimensional contingency ta-
bles and the relaxation of the constraint that a hash function should also be a
compression function. The complexity of our new hash function increases with
regard to the complexity of classical hash functions.
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